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19 N. V. S., 406; Texas Standard

Cotton Oil Co. v. Adone (Tex. Sup.),
19 S. W., 274; Urmston v. Whitelegg, 55 J. P., 453; Cummings v.
Foss, 40 Ill. App., 523; and a combination of manufacturers, owners
of patents, to regulate production
and stifle competition, is void when
the combination is to extend for
fifty years beyond the legal existence of any patent: Strait v. National Harrow Co. (Sup.), 18 N. Y.
S, 224.
Combinations of manufacturers
to regulate their employees wages,
hours of work, etc., in conformity
to rules formulated by a majority
of them, are void, and there can be
no recovery upon a bond given to
enforce the agreement: Hilton v.
Eckersley, 6 El. & BI., 46.
For the provisions of the National

DEPARTMENT

Anti-trust Act and the State statutes
on "trusts" and combinations to
restrict production and competition, see Stimson's American Stat413oB; Vol. II,
ute Law, Vol. I,
8252 and H 9900-9905.
In the following cases the courts
were of opinion that the restraints
on competition and production
were for the necessary protection
of the parties, and did not tend to
create a monopoly: Wickens v.
Evans, 3 Y. & J-, 318; Collins v.
Locke, 4 App. Cases, 674; Skainka
•v. Schaarenghausen, 8 Mo. App.,
622; Ontario Salt Co. v. Merchants'
Salt Co., 18 Grant's Ch. Rep., 54o;
Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Chand., 133;
c.f. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,
io6 N. Y., 473, with Richardson v.
Buhle, 77 Mich., 632.
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4ppearanceof UnauthorizedAttorneyfor Defendant not Served.
Where an attorney appears for a defendant who has not been served
with process, his authority to do so will be presumed; but the defendant
may deny and disprove his authority, and in that case will not be bound
by the attorney's appearance.
I Reported in 52 N. W. Rep., 112.

ATTORNEY'S APPEARANCE.
BINDING FORCE OF ATToRNEY's APPEARANCE.

I. An appearance entered by a
duly authorized attorney, and all
acts done by him in pursuance of
his authority and within its scope,
are binding upon the party from
whom he derives his authority; but
when he has exceeded the limits
granted him, or has acted wholly
without authority,itthen frequently
becomes a difficult question to decide how far the person whom he
claims to represent will be bound
by his unauthorized acts, especially
when the rights of third parties
have intervened. There has been
and is still a marked conflict of decision on this point.
The authority under which the
attorney claims to act need not be
express; it may be inferred from
circumstances, as from the negotiations between him and his clients:
Holden v. Greve (Minn.), 42 N. V.
Rep., 861. When a defendant hands
the copy of the summons served on
him to his son, and the latter employs an attorney to act for both,
authority from the defendant will
be presumed: Wagener v. Swygert
(S. C.), 9 S. R. Rep., 107. An attorney employed by the president
of a corporation has authority to
bind the corporation by his appearance for it: American Ins. Co. v.
Oakley, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 496. An
attorney employed by an agent
who has been in the habit of conducting the suits of a non-resident,
is the authorized attorney of the
latter: Garrison v. McGowan, 48
Cal., 592, and when a committee of
an association, of which a lot-owner
is a member, employs counsel to
defeat tie collection of certain
taxes claimed to be illegal, that
being the object of the association,
and the lot-owner pays the counsel
a certain per cent. on all taxes de-

feated, the counsel will be held to
have been authorized to appear for
him: Neff v. Smyth, iii Ill., ioo.
But the attorney of a decedent has
no authority to appear for his personal representatives without special authority from them: Prior z.
Kiso (Mo.), 9 S. V. Rep.. 893.
The ]ffect ofan Unauthorized Appearance.
A.-Forplaintiff.
As an attorney is a sworn officer
of the Court, and amenable to its
summary jurisdiction for any violation of his professional duty, the
presumption is that he will not appear for any one without due
authority; and, therefore, the entry
of his appearance on the record is
firimafacieproof of such authority,
and the opposite party has a right
to rely and act upon it: Hamilton
V. Wright, 37 N. Y., 502; Smith v.
Bowditch, 7-Pick. (Mass.), 136. Of
course, so long as the action is still
pending, the party himself is not
concluded by this presumption, but
may apply to the Court to stay or
set aside the proceedings: Anon. ix
Ill., 488, and that without payment
of costs; Reynolds v. Howell, 8 L.
R. Q. B., 398. But there is some
conflict of opinion as to whether
this will be done on motion of the
defendant, in the absence of fraud
or imposition: Hubbart vt. Phillips,
2 Dowl. & L., 707; Frye v. Calhoun,
14 Ill., 132, and Magnolia & H.
Fruit Cannery Co. v. Guerne (Cal.),
31 Pac. Rep., 363, support the
affirmative of this proposition,
while Stanhope v. Firmin, 3 Bing.
N. C., 3o, and Kelso v. Steiger
(lvId.), 24 Atl., i8, maintain the
negative. The former would seem
the better view, however, for otherwise great injustice might be done
to a defendant by an unwarranted
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action: and the argument based
upon the sanctity of the record
can have no application while the
suit is still pending, and no judgment has been rendered.
After judgment, however, the
case is different. The defendant
will then be probably concluded in
all cases; and it was the earlier doctrine that the plaintiff would be
concluded likewise if judgment
should be given against him, for he
had his remedy against the attorney. (See cases cited in Denton v.
Noyes, 6 Johns. (N. Y.), 296). If,
however, the attorney should be
insolvent, and unable to respond in
damages, equity will interfere and
enjoin the collection of a judgment
in such case against the plaintiff
for costs: Campbell- v. Bristol, i1
Wend. (N. Y.), xor; Smyth v. Balch,
40 N. H., 363. In one English case,
Mudry v. Newman, i Cromp. M. &
R., 402, the Court held that it was
no answer to a motion for judgment as in case of non suit (Americalicd, non pros ?), that the action
,had been carried on without authority in plaintiffs name by an attorney who could not at the time be
found; but that as the case was one
of great hardship, the rule would
be enlarged to give the plaintiff
time to find the attorney, -nd take
a rule upon him to show cause why
he should not pay defendant's costs.
So, too, if there is evidence of fraud
or collusion, equity will relieve the
plaintiff: De Louis v. Meek, 2 G.
Greene (Iowa), 55.
B.-For defendant.
(I)As was said above, the authority of an attorney to enter an
appearance will be presumed from
the mere fact of his having done
so: Kirschbaum v. Scott, (theprincipal case), (Neb.) 52 N. W. Rep.,
i 112; and the Court will havefirima

faciejurisdiction to proceed in the
cause, whether or not the defendant
has been served with process: Tally
v. Reynolds, i Ark., 99; Cartwell
v. Menifee, 2 Ark., 56; Osborn v.
United States Bank, 9 Wheaton,
738; Handley v. Statelor, 6 Litt.
(Ky.), 186; Kepley v. Irwin, 14
Neb., 3oo; Hayes v. Shattuck, 21
Cal., 5i; Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill.,
544; Bank v. Huntington, 13 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.), 402; England v. Garner, go N. C., 197. This rule, however, does not apply to a Court not
of record, such as a justice's court;
there authority to appear will not
be presumed, but must be affirmatively shown: Sperry v. Reynolds,
65 N. Y., 179. Nor does it apply to
the case of an attorney ad litem,
appointed by the Court to look after
the interests of a non-resident defendantwho has been constructively
summoned. Such an attorney has
no power, by virtue of his appointment, to enter defendant's appearance, or to waive any of his rights;
and in the absence of affirmative

proof of authority from the defendant himself, he is presumed. to act

only under that appointment: Bush
v. Visant, 40 Ark.,

124;

Hill v.

Bates (Ark.), 12' S. W. Rep., 874.
But in all ordinary cases the mere
entry of an appearance in a court

of record by an attorney of the
Court gives him pirimafade authority to act for the defendant, and
he may defend the suit, confess
judgment, or do any other act
within the scope of the general authority of a duly retained attorney,
and these acts will be pirimafacie
valid and binding on the person for
whom he appears, provided that
person is capable of acting forhimself. If he is under tutelage, however, as an idiot, Rogers v. McLean,
31 Barb. (N. Y.), 3o4, an infant, i
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lunatic, or an habitual drunkard,
with process; for by the service
the unauthorized appearance of the the jurisdiction of the Court atattorney will be void; andthe Court taches to his person, and is not decan acquire no jurisdiction thereby. pendent solelynpon the appearance
(2) Itwas the old rule of thecom- of the attorney; the plaintiff, knowmon law, as laid down by Chief ing of the fact of service, has a
Justice HozT in i Salk., 86, that right to presume that he will take
the recital of the record was con- the proper steps necessary to defend
clusive in all cases, and that the himself; and if he fails to do so,
Court would not relieve the defend- after thus having notice of the suit,
ant by opening or setting aside the and an unauthorized appearance is
judgment, but would leave him to entered for him, he has only his
an action against the attorney who own negligence to complain of, and
appeared for him. This, however,
an innocent plaintiff ought not to
was so manifestly oppressive that be made to suffer for it. Furtherit was soon so modified as to afford more, if an appearance was not enrelief against a judgment obtained tered, the defendant would be deby the unauthorized appearance of faulted; and7 as an unauthorized
an attorney, if the latter was insol- appearance saves the default, Bodge
vent and unable to respond in dam- v. Butler, 57 'N. H., 204, he would
ages, if there was evidence of fraud seem to be really benefited by it,
or collusion, or if there were cir- and the plaintiff to be" the injured
cumstances of peculiar hardship, as person. For these reasons, then,
when the defendant was taken in a judgment so obtained after the
custody by ca. sa. on thejudgment:
defendant has been served ought
not to be set aside, unless there are
Hambidge v. De La Crouae, 3 Man.
strong grounds to appeal to the
Gr. & S., 742; Bayly v. Buckland,
i Exch., i. The rule was adopted' mercy of the Court: Rust v. Frothin this form by the courts in this ingham, 1 Ill. kBreese), 268; Schircountry: Tally v. Reynolds, I Ark., ling v. Scites, 41 Miss., 644; University v. Lassiter, 83 N. C., 38.
I; Powers v. Trenor, 3 Hun (N.Y.),
3; Blodget v. Conklin, 9 How. Pr. Service by publication, however, is
(N. Y.), 442; Holmes v. Rogers, 13 not sufficient: Vorce v. Page(Neb.),
Cal., 19I; Baker v. O'Riordan, 65 44 N. W. Rep., 452.
(3) But when the defendant has
Cal., 368. Even a court of equity
has refused to relieve a defendant
not been personally served, and the
from a divorce obtained on the un- jurisdiction of the Court depends
authorized appearance of an attor- .solely on the appearance of the atney for him, when no such equit- torney, the presumption of authorable grounds of interference were
ity is, or should be, far less strong,
alleged: Hoffmire v. Hoffmire, 3 and it would not be far wrong to
hold that the plaintiff should be put
Edw. Ch., 173.
This rule still prevails in New upon* inquiry; and accordingly it
has now become well settled that
Hampshire, Bunton v. Lyford, 37
N. H., 512; (see note to S. C., 75 in such a case the Court will not
merely relieve the defendant on
Am. Dec., 144); Everett v.Warner,
58 N. H., 340, and would seem to proof of the grounds of relief albe the correct rule in all cases
ready mentioned, but will always
where the defendant has been served let him into a defence if he can

BINDING FORME OF
show a good one on the merits:
I 5 enton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. (N. Y.),
296; Lyon v. Boilvin, 2 Gilm., 629;
Kepley v. Irwin, 14 Neb., 300;
Critchfield v. Porter, 3 Ham.
(Ohio), 518; Marvel ,. Manouvrier,
14 La. An.; 3; Ridge v. Alter, 14
La. An., 866; Macomber v. Peck,
39 Iowa, 351; Porter v. Bronson, 19
Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 236; Adams v. Gilbert, 9 Wend., 499; Jones v. Williamson, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.), 371;
Merced Co. v. Hicks, 67 Cal., i08;
Anderson v. Hawhe, 115 Ill., 33. It
has even been stated that a judgment rendered on an unauthorized
appearance without service was absolutely void: First Nat. Bank of
Newton v. Win. B. Grimes Dry
Goods Co., 26 Pac. Rep., 56; see
Kirschbaum v. Sott, (the principal case), 52 N. W. Rep., 1112; but
this view is opposed by an almost
unbroken line of authority, and has
very little in its favor, as it wholly.
ignores the claims to consideration
which the plaintiff certainly possesses, and also those of bona fide
purchasers, whose title under a
merely "voidable judgment would
be good, under a void one worthless. This was very strongly put
by Chief Justice KIT, in Denton
v. Noyes, supra:"To carry our interference beyond this point [letting the defendant into a defence],
would be forgetting that there is
another party in the cause, equally
entitled to our protection. . .
If his [the attorney's] client's denial of authority is to vacate all
the proceedings, the consequences
would be mischievous. The imposition might be intolerable." Every
useful purpose is servcd by the rule
above stated; and there is no sound
reason for extending its bounds,
except, as will be seen later, in
the case of a non-resident defendant.

(4) To such a case this broader
rule applies with peculiar fitness,
the presumption of authority rising
from the entry of appearance being
nullified by the very fact of nonresidence: Bodurtha v. Goodrich, 3
Gray (Mass.), so8; Harshey v.
Blackmarr, 20 Iowa, I61; Kerr v.
Kerr, 41 N. Y., 272; Nordlinger v,
De Mier, 7 N. Y. Suppl., 463.
Against such adefendant the plaintiff can have no equitable right to
his judgment; and therefore it is
the better opinion that a judgment
so obtained against a non-resident
defendant should be set aside, as
between him and the plaintiff, as
absolutely void: Vilas v. Plattsburgh & M. R. Co. (N. Y.), 25 N.
E., 941. This question is most frequently raised in an action on the
judgment against the defendant in
the place of his residence; and it is
settled by anow almost unanimous
current of opinion that it is competent for the defendant in such an
action to impeach the record of the
judgment, in spite of the constitutional provision as to "full faith
and credit," by showing that it was
rendered on an unauthorized appearance for him: Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend., 148; Shumway v.
Stillman, 6 Wend., 447; Harrod v.
Barretto, 2 Hall (N. Y.), 302; Aldrich v, Kinney, 4 Conn., 38o; Lawrence v. Jarvis, 32 Ill., 304; Thompson v. Emmert, i5 Ill., 415; Spaulding v. Swift, i8 Vt., 214; Arnott v.
Webb, i Dill. C. Ct, 362; Price v.
Ward, i Dutch. (N. J.), 225; Welch
v. Sykes, 3 Giln., 197; Gleason v.
Dodd, 4 Mete. (Mass.), 333; Norwood vi. Cobb, 24Tex., 551. Contra,
Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt., 302; see
Scott v. Eaton, 26 Ark., i7. (5) There is considerable difference of opinion on the question
whether an appearance for co-defendants or partners, entered by an
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attorney under authority derived
from one defendant or partner only,
will bind the others. That it will
is the rule as to resident def'endants
in Pennsylvania: McCullough v.
Guetner, i Binn., 214; Scott v.
Israel, 2 Binn., 145; Hatch v. Stitt,
66 Pa., 264, in California: Suydam
v. Pitcher, 4 Cal., 280, and in Vermont: Shottv. Larkins, 13 Vt., 112.
Except in cases of exceptional hardship: Cyphert v. McClune, 22 Pa.,
195; Compher v. Anawalt, 2 Watts
(Pa.), 49o; but elsewhere the contrary doctrine prevails: Reynolds
v. Fleming, 30 Kans., io6; Heaps
v. Hoopes (Md.), 12 AUt. Rep., 882;
Leslie v. Fischer, 62 Ill., 118; Walworth v. Henderson, 9 La. An.,
339; McBride v. Bryan, 67 Ga., 584;
Hambidge v. De La Croude, ioJur.,
io96; Edwards v. Carter, i Stra.,
473; Strangford v. Green, 2 Mod.,
228; especially when the defendant
or partner whose appearance was
entered without authority is not
served with process, or is a nonresident: Franks v. Lockey, 45 Vt.,
395; Nordlinger v. De Mier, 7 N. Y.
Suppl., 463; Hall v. Lanning, gi U.
S., i6o.
(6) When the defendant seeks to
open or vacate avoidable judgment
on the sole ground of an unauthorized appearance, without any additional claims to equitable relief, he
must show that he has a good defence on the merits, or the Court
will be slow to grant the relief
asked: Harris v. Gwin, i8 Miss.,
563; Russell v. Pottawottamie Co.,
29 Iowa, 256.
(7) If the defendant has been
guilty of laches, the judgment will
not be opened or set aside: Dey v.
Hathaway Printing Telegraph and
Telephone Co., 41 N.J. Eq., 419;
Winters v. Means, 41 N. W. Rep.,
157. It must be a strong case to war-

rant the interference of the Court
eight years after the judgment was
rendered: Munnikuyson v. Dorsett,
2 H. & J., 374.
Similarly, delays
of six, Weaver z. Jones, 82 N. C.,
44o, nine, O'Flanagan v. Case
(Kans.), 21 Pac., 96; and twentyeight years, Budd v. Gamble, 13
Fla., 265, have been held fatal to
the defendant's application; but a
lapse of five years will not necessarily defeat his claim to relief:
Dobbins v. Dupree, 39 Ga., 394.
The fact that the defendant knew
of the unauthorized appearance before judgment was rendered will
estop .himfrom contesting its validity: Seale v. McLaughlin, 28
Cal., 668.
(8) If the defendant, either expressly or by implication, confirms
or ratifies the acts of the attorney,
he will be bound by the appearance; and a payment for the services rendered by the attorney will
be a sufficient ratification of his
assumed authority to make the
judgment valid: Ryan v. Doyle, 31
Iowa, 53.
(9) When the rights of third parties have intervened, the Court, as
a rule, will not set aside or open
the judgment, but will protect the
innocent, especially if a bona fide
purchaser at an execution sale, and
leave the defendant to his action
against the attorney: Kenyon v.
Schreck, 52 Ill, 382; Cyphert v.
McClune, 22 Pa., 195; England v.
Garner, 90 N. C., 197. Some of
the courts claim an apparent exception to this rule in favor of a
non-resident defendant not served
with process, against whom it is
urged not even the equities of a
bona fide purchaser will prevail:
Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. (U. S.),
163; Harshey v. Blackmarr, 20
Iowa, 161; Macomber v. Peck, 39
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Iowa, 351; Vilas v. Plattsburgh &
M. R. Co. (N. Y.), 25 N. E. Re1l.,
941; but this is a lonely exception
to the general rule which upholds
the validity of otherwise voidable
judgments in favor of such purchasers, and should be most carefully limited, if allowed at all, to
cases of marked injustice. It operates fully as harshly upon the
innocent purchaser as the other
rule would upon the defendant;
and is derogatory to the dignity of
the Court, upon the truth of whose
records the purchaser had a right
to rely. If they can be so impeached for one cause, where shall
the line be drawn and what security can a purchaser have?
(io) The validity of a judgment
rendered upon an'unauthorized appearance, like other voidable judgments, may be attacked in a direct
proceeding: Great West. Min. Co.
v. Woodmas of Alston Min. Co.,
2o Pac. Rep., 771, but not collaterally: Denton v. Roddy, 34 Ark.,
642; Reed v. Pratt, 2 Hill (N. Y.),
64;.Brown v. Nichols, 42 N. Y., 26;
Wandling v. Straw, 25 W. Va., 692.
Contra, Hess v. Cole, 23 N. J. L.,
II6. This rule, however, for manifest reasons, does not apply, as has
been seen, to a foreign judgment,
nor to one obtained by fraud or collusion : Martin v. Judd, 6o Ill., 78;
Ferguson v. Crawford, 7o N. Y.,
253; Buchanan v. Bilger, 64 Texas,
59o. There is also some conflict of
authority as to what is a direct and
what a collateral attack; but it
seems to be conceded in all the
States except New York that a bill
in equity to vacate the judgment is
a direct attack upon it.
(i i) The proceeding to relieve the
defendant against such a judgment
may be either by motion duringthe
pendency of the cause: Roe v. Doe,

Barnes, 39; Bradley v. Welch (Mo.),
12 S. W. Rep., 9ii; Dillon v. Rand
(Col.), 25 Pac. Rep., 185; see Bodge
v. Butler, 57 N. H., 204; or by writ
of error after judgment: Bodurtha
z. Goodrich, 3 Gray (Mass.), 5o8;
Abbott v. Dutton, 44 Vt., 564.
After judgment has been rendered,
however, the proper practice is by
motion in the cause to open or set
aside the judgment, in which case
the court can impose whatever
terms and conditions it thinks
proper in order to protect the
plaintiff, in case he should subsequently recover on the merits:
layly v. . Buckland, i Exch., i;
Lyon v. Boilvin, 2 Gilm., 629;
Critchfield v. Porter, 3 Ham. (Ohio),
518; Cleveland v. Hopkins, 55 Wis.,
387; Leslie v. Fischer, 62 Ill., i8;
Kepley v. Irwin, 14 Neb., 3oo; Reynolds v. Fleming, 3o Kan., io6;
Heap v. Hoopes (Md.), 12 Atl. Rep.,
882; Woods v. Dickinson, 7 Mackey
(D. C.), 3ol; which protection is
best effected by letting the defendant into a defence, but preserving
the lien of the judgment: Bryant
v. Williams, 21 Iowa, 329; Wiley
v. Pratt, 23 Ind., 628; Blodget v.
Conklin, 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 442;
by bill in equity, in which case the
court can pay full regard to the
conflicting equities of all the parties
in interest: Handley v. Statelor, 6
Litt. (Ky.), 186; Boro v. Harris, 13
Lea (Tenn.), 36; Shelton v. Tiffin,
6 How. (U. S.), 163; Harshey v.
Blackmarr, 20 Iowa, 16I; Jones v.
Williamson, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.), 371;
Coles v. Aiderson, 8 Humph.
(Tenn.), 489; or,-when so provided
by statute, by petition for review:
McNamara v. Carr, 84 Me., 299;
S. C., 24 Atl. Rep., 856. In New
York the only remedy against the
judgment, except in the case of a
foreign judgment, or one obtained

